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The international organizations involved in peacebuilding, democratization 
and peacekeeping in the Yugoslav successor states have employed 
thousands of locally-recruited workers as project officers, language 
intermediaries and support staff. This makes them a distinct employment 
sector within these post-socialist and in several cases post-conflict 
economies, most significantly in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo. This paper 
evaluates arguments in favour of regarding this workforce firstly as a group of 
workers suffering precarity and secondly as a privileged social elite. While 
there are good grounds for recognising them as a distinctive social group, this 
distinctiveness has not led to a widely-expressed social identity based on the 
commonalities of their employment. 
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Since 1991, the nature of the break-up of Yugoslavia, the course of the conflict and 
the structure of the international interventions in the Yugoslav successor states 
during and after the wars have brought a number of new social groups into being. 
The public sphere in all these states contains many organizations claiming to 
represent the collective social identities of those who experienced the conflict in a 
certain way: every political entity thus has its associations of veterans, of wounded 
veterans, of bereaved mothers, of ex-prisoners, of displaced persons, and of other 
groups whose roles in the war have been acknowledged in established public 
narratives.1 Yet when it comes to those who worked for the international armed 
forces and civilian organizations that have been hiring local workforces since 
interventions on the ground began in 1992, similar associations do not seem to exist. 
These workers are also relatively invisible in other ways. The locally-recruited 
language intermediaries and project workers working in the ‘international 
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organization’ sector in Yugoslav successor states do not appear as tropes in popular 
representations of the conflict to the extent that veterans, refugees and other such 
figures have been depicted in post-Yugoslav fiction and cinema, and where they do 
appear they are supporting characters rather than protagonists whose transformation 
is the focus of the narrative. There is not an institutionalized role for the local 
employees of international organizations in public debate or commemoration, nor is 
there a sense that this is demanded. It can be suggested, nonetheless, that the local 
workforce of international intervention in the Yugoslav successor states represents 
another social group to have emerged from the break-up of Yugoslavia, perhaps 
even a novel social class. Those who worked for international organizations during 
periods of large-scale violence and/or the implementation phases of a peace 
agreement were, like other groups with more recognition in post-Yugoslav societies, 
personally present in and affected by their presence in, a zone of conflict, and their 
experiences were structured by their social role.  
Scholarship in sociology and political economy frequently distinguishes between 
the idea of a class as a set of people sharing the same socio-economic conditions 
and a class that has consciousness of itself as a class, with the ability to mobilize 
and take collective action: the difference between what Marx referred to as a ‘class 
in itself’ and a ‘class for itself’.2 In Marxist terms this made consciousness-raising 
activism imperative in order to transform a class from the former to the latter. The 
teleology of this projection is, however, questionable.3 For understanding the 
significance of class in society, it may be more productive – and more compatible 
with anti-essentialist approaches to identity in general – to consider it as a social 
process rather than a relatively fixed group.4 It is nevertheless useful to ask not only 
whether those working in a particular employment sector occupy a distinctive 
position in society but also -- given the significance of international organizations as 
socio-economic actors in the Yugoslav successor states -- how aware they are of 
this. In the case of the local workforce of international intervention, the nature of their 
employment has created an interplay of precarization and privilege which is 
distinctive within the postsocialist space – characterizations I will refer to using the 
terms ‘precariat’, a label popularized by Guy Standing to refer to what he considers 
as a contemporary precarious proletariat,5 and ‘projectariat’, an inversion of that 
label which I apply to the idea of local international-organization workers as a 
privileged elite. Yet this distinctive social position has not given rise to a widely-
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expressed and collective social identity based on current or former membership of 
this workforce. The reasons for this must be sought both in the conditions of the work 
itself and in the broader context of social disengagement in the post-Yugoslav 
region. 
This inquiry into the local workforce of international intervention follows on from a 
research project (Languages at War) with which I was involved between 2008 and 
2011, which studied the significance of languages in peace operations in Bosnia-
Herzegovina (BiH) during the Bosnian conflict and the years immediately after the 
Dayton Peace Agreement.6 Within this project, I opened up a research agenda on 
the working identities and experiences of people who had been employed as 
language intermediaries by one or more elements of the UN and NATO forces that 
had been stationed in BiH (31 of my interviewees fitted this profile; the remainder 
were mostly British military personnel, plus a smaller number of British civilian 
linguists and 2 former Danish soldiers).7 This sought to identify how language 
intermediaries and the military personnel they worked with or for had conceived of 
local workers’ roles, the educational trajectories and ‘language learning narratives’ of 
people who had become locally-employed language intermediaries, the shared 
experiences of a cohort of field interpreters in Republika Srpska, and the ways in 
which language intermediaries had made sense of the new political economy that 
post-socialism, armed conflict and international intervention had produced.8 
Interpreters, however, formed only one part of a larger locally-recruited workforce of 
international intervention which included project officers, cleaners, kitchen workers, 
IT specialists, administrators and other kinds of roles. Though these jobs differed in 
responsibilities and pay, it was not unusual for one individual to have worked in 
several different capacities for international organizations; analytically, this suggests 
one can conceive of an international-organizations ‘sector’ as a whole rather than 
several sectors made up of independent occupational groups. 
The economic impact of international intervention missions on localities is 
acknowledged in the concept of a ‘peacekeeping economy’.9 This brings an extra 
level of complexity beyond the dislocations caused by the situation that is being 
intervened in, complicated further by the economic links between what the 
intervention does and what local actors in a conflict do.10 International organizations 
are nonetheless a very significant economic presence in these contexts, and bring 
with them new forms of inequality between local people and international staff.11 The 
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‘peacekeeping economy’ is defined in more detail by Kathleen M. Jennings, in her 
research on Haiti and Liberia, as ‘the economic multiplier effect of peacekeeping 
operations via direct or indirect resource flows into the local economy, as well as to 
the construction or reconstruction of housing stock and other infrastructure, including 
“entertainment infrastructure”’.12 Its direct resource flows in the form of employment 
comprise many different kinds of work, at varying levels of formality: ‘the skilled, 
semi-skilled or unskilled formal sector jobs available to local staff in UN or NGO 
offices’, informal work for international staff, and sex work.13 Jennings’s own 
research, however, focuses on sex work rather than other sectors of the 
peacekeeping economy. The experiences of local workforces directly employed by 
intervention agencies are still remarkably under-researched.  
Conceiving of a ‘peacekeeping economy’ helps to identify the distinctiveness of 
this category of employment in a local context and also to call attention to the fact 
that, wherever interventions take place, this type of employment is likely to exist. 
This paper attempts to position the local workforce of international intervention in the 
Yugoslav successor states within wider post-Yugoslav society by attempting to 
locate them within the inequalities that have been created and exacerbated in these 
societies during and after the break-up of Yugoslavia, and to account for the 
weakness of the collective occupational identity that at first sight ought to exist.  
Precarity and labour insecurity 
The characteristic experience of life in post-war BiH, Stef Jansen argues in his 
research into displacement and return, has been ‘precariousness’ and the desire to 
overcome it.14 This precariousness should be thought of as a result not only of 
factors directly attributable to the war and the methods with which it was fought, but 
also of even deeper structural changes associated with the collapse of Yugoslav 
socialism and the establishment of a capitalist economy based on clientelistic 
privatization and neoliberal economic reforms.15 Although certain factors that have 
helped to shape BiH’s economic trajectory are specific to that country, other factors 
are common to all the Yugoslav successor states whether or not they were sites of 
protracted armed conflict. The local workforce of international intervention in the 
Yugoslav successor states therefore needs to be situated within this context. 
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Biographical interviews with former interpreters (one component of this workforce) 
brings to the foreground individual experiences of the impact of this precariousness 
on personal and family lives, but also commonly shared experiences that help to 
situate this workforce as a group.16 Individual narratives told of desires to provide for 
retired, unemployed or unpaid parents; to repair property that had been damaged 
during or just after the war; to support oneself and one’s family in a town to which 
they had been displaced; to manage medical conditions; to find ways of working that 
allowed one, as a parent, to provide a more secure existence for one’s children and 
still to be able to spend time at home with them; to force an international employer to 
take responsibility for harm caused to a worker in the course of their work; to put 
together the resources necessary to work or study abroad and eventually to acquire 
permanent residence in another more economically stable country. Each narrative 
differed in its turning points and emphases, although the economic circumstances of 
BiH had to be taken into account in the various decisions made. This observation 
could apply to the narrative of almost anyone in BiH. Other factors, however, were 
much more distinctive to the particular type of employer and contract that they had 
had. These included salaries that were two to three times the average local wage 
and did not require a university degree or many years’ experience, and at least some 
possibility of being hired without the veze (personal connections) required for a job in 
local administration,17 but also distinct forms of precariousness that existed because 
of the work: the minimal or non-existent provision of sickness and maternity leave 
under many (but not all) contracts; the possibility of contract termination with a 
month’s notice or less; the risk of injury that was experienced by interpreters who 
travelled on assignments with military units rather than working full-time at a 
headquarters. These meant that language intermediaries for foreign military forces in 
BiH did experience a specific form of precarity.  
The concept of ‘precarity’ has emerged from French sociology and from labour 
movements in southern Europe to stand for an endemic economic uncertainty to 
which an ever greater number of people in the West are structurally exposed.18 Its 
usefulness is in pointing to the effect of these conditions on the individual sense of 
self: it connotes not only the instability of living conditions in the short term but also 
an insecurity of the life course, and is associated with the absence of an ongoing 
work-based identity or a sense of progress that many of those now affected by 
precarity will have grown up expecting to experience.19 The term ‘precariat’ is used 
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by Guy Standing to signal that those who are experiencing this dislocation, and 
particularly who are making the adjustment to -- or attempting to resist -- this shift in 
expectations for the life course, ought to be considered as a distinctive social group 
that risks becoming a site of social instability within the contemporary Western class 
structure if it is not already.20  
The usefulness of this concept is not so much in Standing’s reading of what drives 
social conflict, or in his terms of reference, which are restricted to the global North. 
Critiques of the language of precarity and precariousness have made their points 
well that ‘precariousness has always been a seemingly natural condition’ for workers 
and urban poor in the global South,21 and indeed for ‘societal others’ such as 
undocumented migrants who are excluded from the welfare states of the global 
North.22 Where the idea of the ‘precariat’ does still have some value is in the 
invitation to conceptualize a social group defined by the experience of a precarity 
they have previously not been used to. Precarity is not an entirely common 
experience, since systems of privilege based on gender, racism, cissexism, ableism, 
ethno-national identity and migration status (a non-exhaustive list) intersect with it in 
ways that Standing’s own analysis does necessarily account for. What may be in 
some way shared, however, is a sense of some disruption to the life course and an 
inability to predict its future direction, rather than the precise state in which these 
processes leave each individual. The question when it comes to the local workforce 
of international intervention in the Yugoslav successor states would then be whether 
they can or should be conceived of as a group defined by the experience of 
precarization.  
Interpreters employed by foreign armed forces were certainly subject to all seven 
forms of labour insecurity identified by Standing: labour market security (adequate 
opportunities to earn income); employment security (“hiring and firing” protections); 
job security (ability to continue in the same line of work with growth in income and 
status); work security (health and safety protection at work); skill reproduction 
security (opportunity to be trained and to use the new skills); income security 
(assured adequate and stable income, including social security); and representation 
security (collective representation of workers).23 The same can be said to at least 
some degree for the wider group of local workers employed by international 
organizations. The clearest form of labour insecurity that this workforce has 
experienced lies in the short-term, project-based nature of the work (thus relating to 
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job security). Certain posts were and are linked to specifically funded projects with a 
fixed end date or with a constant and uncertain search for follow-on funding. 
Whereas some organizations appear to be present in a country for an indefinite 
period, others are subject to continued uncertainty about the length of their 
involvement (e.g. when foreign military forces are present on frequently renewed 
mandates rather than with a commitment of a knowable period of time), making it 
difficult to conceive of the jobs they offer as long-term. Depending on the 
organization, opportunities for structured progress, promotion and growth in skills 
may also be limited (affecting job security and skill reproduction security). Pathways 
for locally-employed workers to progress within an organization exist in some 
organizations but not others: some of those directly employed by the United Nations, 
for instance, have been able to be integrated into the organization and work on UN 
projects elsewhere in the world (such as a former medical doctor who became a 
senior interpreter at the UNPROFOR HQ in Sarajevo and later a UN programme 
officer in Iraq, eventually joining the Iraq team of the UN’s Department of Political 
Affairs).24 At the other extreme were posts such as the interpreting contracts offered 
by individual military forces in BiH (apart from the NATO HQ structure, which did 
operate a more professionalized language service after 2000).25 These did tend to 
offer a graduated pay scale, but its structure was simple (based on length of service 
and/or a very basically framed language test) and did not contain significant 
incentives to progress; people working as interpreters could grow in informal 
seniority and responsibility but rarely had local civilian posts within the same 
organization that they could move into, though some schemes to civilianize 
administrative support did exist. The work histories of local staff are characterized by 
frequent changes of job and discontinuity. 
The other forms of labour insecurity also apply. Labour market security (adequate 
opportunities of any kind to earn income) is regrettably poor in all the Yugoslav 
successor states, though the extent of this insecurity varies between and indeed 
within them. Income security (an assured adequate and stable income) cannot be 
said to be assured for the local employees of international organizations, given the 
structural instability of project-based working. Representation security, the collective 
representation of workers, is also absent: international organizations’ local 
employees are not represented by any union or professional association. While there 
are for instance associations of professional translators in the different successor 
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states which may include members who have worked for international organizations, 
they are constituted as associations of those with professional qualifications and 
experience in translation and are concerned with defending professional quality and 
rates against amateur competition (which may also include former employees of 
international organizations).26 Levels of employment security (protection from 
unequal recruitment practices and unfair dismissal) and work security (how far 
employees’ health and safety are protected at work) will have varied depending on 
the contracts offered by each organization and also, in historical perspective, on the 
period during which a person worked. Under the most precarious military interpreting 
contracts, interpreters could be dismissed by supervisors at will, and the contracts in 
any case lasted month to month.27 The degree of work security or insecurity varied 
even more drastically depending on organization, location and time. Working in an 
area directly affected by conflict in a period where fighting was occurring posed the 
greatest ongoing danger, followed by the shorter-term dangers of working in a 
locality that was experiencing civil unrest. Posts that required frequent field visits and 
therefore frequent travel incurred more danger than posts based at a headquarters 
or an urban office, and risks associated with travel would be further inflected by 
factors such as whether a route used had been mined or whether an organization’s 
drivers or vehicles were thought to be at high risk of causing accidents. Work 
security and the financial and health-related consequences of injury were among the 
most important preoccupations of the field interpreters I interviewed,28 but this cannot 
be generalized (at least not in terms of intensity) to the experiences of local 
employees of international organizations as a whole.  
These combinations of working conditions are deserving of research, and differ 
from the experiences of people employed by local firms or by the domestic public 
sector in BiH. However, the sector of international organization employment is often 
remarkably invisible in the literature on the political economy of BiH, which along with 
Kosovo must be where this sector has the most importance compared to other 
sectors. Michael Pugh’s research on BiH, for instance, characterizes the Bosnian 
economy usefully in many respects: this is a picture of BiH where the individuals 
most implicated in the use and ordering of violence during the war are still the 
greatest economic beneficiaries in the country, and where the state has been 
systematically diminished as an economic actor ‘by privatizing essential services and 
shifting responsibility for employment and welfare from the state to the individual’.29 
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Its economy is characterized by crony capitalism and privatization, poor growth, high 
unemployment, dependence on the informal economy, and ‘aggressive social 
engineering’ directed towards shrinking the country’s public and social space.30 His 
article with Boris Divjak on corruption does acknowledge ‘aid disbursements and 
transfers by peacekeepers and foreign personnel (still an estimated 9 per cent of 
GDP in 2006)’ as an important component of the Bosnian economy.31 The 
international organizations sector is discussed in the context of growth but not in the 
context of the success or failure of job creation, where it has clearly had a non-
negligible impact for at least a section of Bosnian society. 
Does studying this workforce alter the picture of the economy in BiH (and suggest 
therefore that it may alter it for other Yugoslav successor states as well)? Even if it 
does not do so at a macro level, at a more local and person-centric levels of analysis 
this workforce clearly exists. Viewing this workforce through the lens of precarization 
provides one way of understanding their socio-economic positioning, but does not 
account for an alternative way to regard them: that compared to other members of 
their society who have not been in a position to take up this form of employment they 
are in fact in a privileged position within the post-conflict economy. Stef Jansen 
makes this observation in his analysis of the political economy of post-Dayton BiH: 
‘Foreign Intervention Agencies provided many of the best remunerated jobs in the 
formal economy’, despite the short-term nature of the contracts, and were also a 
source of ‘language proficiency, social networks and finances’ that facilitated mobility 
abroad.32 The following section considers a number of ways in which the local 
workforce of international organizations might be regarded as privileged. However, 
even if this workforce ought to be considered a beneficiary of the intervention, it has 
not collectively benefited from the post-conflict economy in the same way as, for 
instance, the stratum of elite privatizers. Its privileges within society lie in different 
sites.  
 
A ‘projectariat’ apart?  
 
A different approach to understanding the position of local staff members of 
international organizations in the Yugoslav successor states might be to regard them 
as a group who by virtue of the skills and experience they had gained while working 
for international organizations could have had a distinctive advantage in promoting 
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inter-ethnic reconciliation or taking action that would improve the general quality of 
life in their country. Gordana Božić, for instance, comments with reference to BiH: 
‘Those young men and women, often in their teens, working as language assistants 
for the international organizations were the first to cross to “the other side” during 
and after the conflict.’33 Božić argues that these early inter-ethnic crossings of 
boundaries were largely a pragmatic choice based on economic reasons rather than 
a performative demonstration of multi-ethnic idealism: ‘Getting or protecting a job, 
and not their “natural” predisposition to ethnic tolerance, was the main force in 
overcoming or suppressing their fear and distrust felt towards the members of other 
ethnic groups’.34  
This is not to say that, in narratives with a longer perspective, workers who had 
been crossing inter-ethnic boundaries at these times would necessarily narrate their 
actions as having been solely economically motivated.35 Three of the former 
interpreters I interviewed near Banja Luka who had been working for British forces in 
the first few years after Dayton, for instance, considered that the work had given 
them insights into alternative ways that political and social relations in BiH could be 
organized, and implied that their voices and views were marginalized in Republika 
Srpska society as a whole.36 Another interpreter from a Federation town who had 
been employed on an IFOR/SFOR base in Republika Srpska in his late teens 
narrated an adult life course that had begun with crossing the lines through work, 
continued by serving as an example for other people in his home town to visit the 
neighbouring town in the RS, and led to further work towards reconciliation as a 
project officer in a different international organization.37 These narrators did attach a 
significance to the movements of their younger selves in ways that went beyond the 
economic. The question still remains, however, of how far an orientation towards 
alternatives to ethnopolitics on the part of local staff would have been developed 
through the experiences of their work and how far it would have stemmed from 
existing predispositions as a result of factors such as socio-political engagement, 
parental attitudes,  intergenerational class identifications and a commitment to 
‘staying normal’, all of which could then have led to making this type of work more 
attractive among the available means of improving the economic situation of oneself 
and one’s family. 
Another lens on how the local employees of international organizations might be 
regarded as set apart from the societies of the Yugoslav successor states appears in 
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Paul Stubbs’s study of the operations of a Croatian humanitarian NGO during the 
conflicts in Croatia and BiH, where he argues that the Croatian NGO sector was ‘a 
source of global upwards social mobility’ for locals who worked in it, bringing them 
into a ‘new globalized professional middle class’ who mutually reciprocated funding 
decisions.38 This class in Croatia, he suggests, was to at least some extent a 
continuity of ‘those who formed the middle class, and sometimes the elite, in post-
1945 Croatia but also those who claim membership, or have the hallmarks, of a 
previous, Austrian or Austro-Hungarian, middle class’39 -- suggesting that 
understanding the processes through which this workforce constitutes itself requires 
attention to the symbolic practices of identification with ‘urban’ and ‘cosmopolitan’ 
values discussed by Stef Jansen.40 Adam Fagan, writing on Bosnia-Herzegovina, 
similarly observed that ‘the ownership of this knowledge and expertise [developed by 
work with and for international organizations] is currently in the hands of a few -- an 
elite group of civil society organization professionals [...]’.41 Were local staff then not 
so much a new class so much as a reproduction of a class that was already 
identifiable in pre-war Yugoslavia? Access to the pre-requisites for obtaining jobs 
with international organizations (for instance, the ability to have learned English 
regardless of what language one had been assigned to learn at school) is likely to 
have been socially stratified to at least some extent,42 although to what extent for the 
societies of the various successor states still requires more research. Even if this 
sector represented only the reproduction of a class, however, it was still a class that 
was reproducing itself in novel ways that had been brought on by the conditions of 
postconflict, postsocialist life.  
A further dimension of advantage from which local employees of international 
organizations had the ability to benefit is proposed by James Scott in his discussion 
of the power available to ‘local guide’-type figures (as Scott terms them) in contexts 
where the power of a state is extending into and radically reshaping social relations. 
In the French colonization of Vietnam, for instance, Vietnamese French-speakers 
employed as clerks and language intermediaries enjoyed fluency in the new 
‘language’ of land tenure and the ability to profit personally from this head start in 
understanding, as well as significant control over how the new system would be 
represented to the non-French-speaking cultivators and tenants of land.43 ‘[A]ll those 
who had mastered the official linguistic code’ were similarly privileged as 
intermediaries in metropolitan France when the French state strove to make local 
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practice ‘legible’ by insisting that all interaction with the state and the law was to take 
place in standard French.44 Recent research in Translation Studies makes a similar 
point, calling for research into the agency of translators to account for their capacity 
for manipulation and bias and to reflect critically on the comforting myth of the 
translator as an inter-cultural bridge.45 This would require looking in more detail at 
the ways in which local employees of international organizations may have been 
able to gain from the knowledge acquired through their positions and their power to 
frame that knowledge in representing it to others – as well as examining the 
advantages that holding one of these posts may have provided in the informal 
economy.  
The least equivocal researchers in identifying local employees of international 
organizations as a social group have been Sultan Barakat and Zilha Kapisazović, 
who refer to them as ‘a new Bosnian social class’.46 At the same time, however, they 
suggest that the organizations who employed these workers tended to think of them 
as no more than ‘a quasi-group that will disappear as the international presence 
declines’.47 This contrasts with the ways that international organizations regard those 
social groups that have been publicly and institutionally recognized as having been 
produced as a result of the conflict, such as veterans or refugees: the reintegration of 
war-affected groups into post-war society is ostensibly among the objectives of an 
intervention, however poorly implemented or unsuccessful it may turn out to be. No 
corresponding structural need is however perceived to reintegrate local staff. Barakat 
and Kapisazović’s study in Sarajevo during the early 2000s found that many 
organizations felt that the most likely long-term strategy for their local staff was likely 
to be starting a new business; these same potential entrepreneurs, on the other 
hand, felt that they lacked the knowledge and start-up capital to consider doing so, 
and were instead likely to seek work with a different kind of employer inside or 
outside BiH.48 The international intervention can thus be seen as presenting a 
paradoxical combination of long-term aspirations and short-term thinking. On the one 
hand, the organizations’ work was supposed to bring about deep structural changes 
in the country’s civil society, economic functionality, and political relations; at the 
level of funding, however, projects existed from grant to grant; organizations had 
plans for macro-level change but little in the way of firm strategies for how the local 
staff they had employed might be able to contribute to that change after their 
employment, in the long term.  
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In attempting to identify the local staff of international organizations as a social 
group, one must assess how far the similarities in working conditions that they have 
experienced, and the ways in which they have been positioned in society as a result 
of their work, have led to the emergence of an occupational group identity which is 
self-conscious. These workers’ common status as locally-recruited employees of 
international organizations would be more meaningful if it was a shared experience 
from which they themselves derived meaning, rather than just a label analytically 
imposed from outside. While current and former workers in this sector certainly have 
social practices and networks based on their work, it is harder to talk about a group 
‘identity’ in the sense of a social group which has public representation as such. It is 
difficult even to find a one-word term that will still incorporate everyone whom it 
ought to include (‘project workers’ and ‘interpreters’, for instance, are not identical 
but both fall into this wider space). Barakat and Kapetanović use the term lokalci, or 
‘locals’, throughout their article,49 yet the people to whom it refers are local in relation 
to the non-local staff members of the organizations they work for, not in relation to 
the rest of the society they live in. With an ethical commitment to representing people 
in the terms by which they wish to be defined, it is important to find a term that 
makes sense within their own experience. This terminological difficulty suggests in 
itself that a strong social identity derived from this form of work is lacking: no one 
word has emerged with which people who have done this work represent themselves 
collectively.  
The weakness of social identification should be explained with reference to the 
structure of the employment itself, but also of the wider socio-economic and political 
context in which this employment sector has been situated. Employment trajectories 
in this sector are fragmented and transitory. The sector itself could be characterised 
as fragmented, in the sense that it is composed of multiple organizational practices 
and cultures (including those of foreign military forces, United Nations offices, large 
humanitarian NGOs such as the International Committee of the Red Cross or 
Médecins Sans Frontières, national development agencies, inter-governmental 
political organizations, small-scale humanitarian and conflict-resolution initiatives, 
and civil society foundations). Yet it is common for workers in this sector to have 
switched between several different types of organization, working on a short-term 
basis for each one; this would mitigate the potential fragmentary effect of 
organizational differences on solidarity among their local employees.  
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A more serious obstacle is the question of whether certain jobs in this sector have 
resulted in better transferable skills than other jobs and thus permit much more 
successful strategies for ameliorating precarity, to an extent that would frustrate 
attempts to conceive of workers in this sector as a unified social group (particularly 
whether a divide between non-manual and manual labour cleaves through the 
potential unifying factors). This cannot be answered without taking into account the 
backgrounds and positionality of employees’ backgrounds before entering the sector. 
For instance, movement from a manual job such as kitchen hand into a non-manual 
and better paid interpreting job (which might then lead to project work with another 
organization) was not unknown among locally-recruited employees of foreign military 
forces in Bosnia-Herzegovina in the late 1990s.50 However, it was primarily younger 
workers with higher cultural capital (students, graduates, or people who would have 
expected to be studying if not for the war) who were able to follow this route of 
working themselves up: age, class and prior education, as well as family 
responsibilities and ties to a particular place, all affected whether and how workers in 
the lower-status and lower-paid jobs with international organizations sought to move 
on from them. Taking individual life courses into account also calls attention to the 
third dimension of fragmentation that has impeded the formation of a self-conscious 
group. This third dimension is that working in this sector has typically been 
conceived of as an expedient, not a profession in itself. People typically began 
working for international organizations because it was the only work available or the 
highest-paying work available, or because the war and its aftermath had made it 
impossible for them to fulfil their pre-war career intentions.51 Employment in the 
international organizations sector thus appears more as a stopgap, a springboard to 
opportunities elsewhere, or an enforced necessity rather than an end in its own right: 
often it is conceived of as a temporary stage to be passed through, whether or not an 
individual succeeds in passing through it.  
However, answers must also be sought outside the sector itself. The break-up of 
Yugoslavia involved the weakening – some would say the deliberate destruction – of 
all forms of solidarity other than ethnic, a process at its most forceful in the 
successor societies that experienced armed conflict in the 1990s; where non-ethnic 
solidarities have been re-asserted, they must compete with the dominant discourses 
of ethnopolitics. The collapse of many pre-war industries and the 
deinstitutionalization of organized labour have drastically weakened work-based 
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solidarity across the Western Balkans, as shown by the decline of trades unions 
across the region.52 The civil society promotion initiatives that have formed part of 
international organizations’ peacebuilding strategies have not prioritized social 
solidarity among occupational groups, and in practice have hived off a ‘relatively 
small set of professionalized civil society actors’ which have adapted to donors’ 
preferred practices at the risk of becoming detached from broader society outside 
these narrow milieus.53 These are not propitious conditions in which a new self-
conscious occupational social identity can emerge. The lack of self-conscious 
identification by international organization workers as an occupational group must be 
seen in the context of the depoliticization of society across the region since the 
break-up of Yugoslavia. Recent events such as the anti-corruption rallies in Croatia 
in 2011 and the ‘JMBG protests’ in Bosnia-Herzegovina in 2013 (expressing anger 
that a dispute between politicians from the constitutional entities was temporarily 
preventing the registration of births) suggested an increased capacity for public 
mobilization around non-ethnic themes in the aftermath of the global financial 
crisis.54 A more sustained mass engagement in support of social and political 
alternatives to ethnopolitical clientelism took place in Tuzla, Sarajevo and other 
deindustrialized cities in Bosnia-Herzegovina in February 2014, at the time this 
article was being revised for publication.55 The longer-term outcomes of these 
protests cannot yet be determined, nor can the prospects for them to strengthen self-
recognition of an occupational identity among ex-employees of international 




Of all the members of post-Yugoslav societies with whom international organizations 
have had contact, their most sustained and everyday contact has been with their 
own locally-recruited employees. Yet – despite the great volume of reporting that 
such organizations generate about other matters – empirical evidence about their 
own workers’ circumstances, experiences and trajectories remains slight. Academic 
research has also paid little attention to these workers as a category. To conceive of 
them as such is admittedly impeded by certain factors – both the stratification and 
inequality of workers within the sector, and the lack of a self-consciously articulated 
narrative of their occupational identity as a social role. Yet the sheer number of 
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people who have worked for international organizations in former Yugoslavia in the 
last two decades makes this sector worthy of greater recognition both in research 
and in policy. Their invisibility as a workforce to date, combined with the short-term-
ism of international intervention, makes it easy for them to be institutionally 
disregarded. International organizations should, at the very least, take more note of 
the effects of the employment they create and the employment conditions that they 
stipulate or permit. Although examples of better practice exist, too many posts in this 
sector have been created without built-in pathways for developing and training staff 
within an organization, with short notice periods and without sufficient provision for 
health care.  
Even though the potential for deriving a broader social identity from membership 
of the international-organization workforce is weak, this employment sector is still an 
important phenomenon within the postsocialist, postconflict economy in former 
Yugoslavia. For those who have worked in it, it is often a source of lasting social ties, 
as well as material and immaterial resources that affect their life course in the future. 
For researchers, it is an example of the kind of area for empirical inquiry that tends to 
be neglected as a consequence of the over-representation of ethnic politics and elite 
institution-building in much of the academic literature, particularly in sociology and 
political science.56 Improving the evidence base relating to this workforce will also 
make it possible to understand more accurately how they are positioned within wider 
social relations, and foregrounding the locally-recruited staff of international 
interventions will add an extra dimension to the recognition of local agency within 
peacekeeping economies.57 This form of employment therefore needs to be taken 
into account in research inspired by the so-called ‘local turn’ in the critical study of 
peacebuilding.58 
The evidence base on the international-organizations employment sector should 
also be broadened beyond the focus on large-scale missions that has been 
maintained in the literature so far (and to which the use of data from BiH admittedly 
also contributes), since this risks leaving invisible other sites and spaces that have 
not hosted missions of this size. The relationship between global practices of 
security and intervention and more localized experiences of post-socialist dislocation 
takes in not just BiH, Kosovo and the former UN Protected Areas in Croatia but also 
the entirety of eastern Europe, where foreign bases and training facilities are also to 
be found; where the shape of the domestic military and its relationship with wider 
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society has been conditioned by adapting to NATO enlargement and to coalition 
warfare in Iraq and Afghanistan; where foreign-funded projects in support of 
democratization and civil society create jobs with a similar profile to those being 
discussed here. These sites also should not be neglected in future research, even 
though the focus of this paper is only on the Yugoslav successor states.  
Despite the further research that remains to be done on this workforce, it is 
already evident that a binary of economic ‘beneficiaries’ and ‘victims’ of the break-up 
of Yugoslavia is too simplistic to accommodate the complexities of how the locally-
recruited workforce of international intervention is situated within post-Yugoslav 
societies. To speak of this workforce only as part of a transnational ‘precariat’ misses 
some important aspects of its character and origin. To speak of it only as a 
‘projectariat’ may risk lifting the people who have happened to do this work away 
from their counterparts with similar values and symbolic practices who have not. 
There is nevertheless a case for more extensive study of the people, experiences 
and processes that have constituted this workforce since international organizations 
began recruiting large numbers of workers within the Yugoslav successor states: in 
order to pursue a research question outside the constraints of a narrow focus on 
ethnic politics, in order to fill out questions of local agency in peacebuilding, and in 
order to better inform how international organizations may manage their locally-
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